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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 2, 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist based
in the United States, walked into the Saudi consulate in Istanbul,
Turkey, where he was brutally murdered and dismembered by
Saudi government agents.1 It was a brazen violation of the most
fundamental, internationally recognized human rights, carried out
by one close US ally in the territory of another close ally.2 The US
intelligence community quickly determined that the Saudi
government and its Crown Prince, Mohammed Bin Salman, were
responsible for the killing.3 Members of Congress briefed by the
* Professor of Law, Co-Director, Center for International and Comparative Law, St.
John's University School of Law. Thank you to Samantha Ragonesi, Michael Campbell,
Kelsey Halloran, the editors of the Fordham International Law Journal, and the participants
of the February 2020 Symposium on the Global Judiciary.
1. Agnes Callamard, Khashoggi Killing: UN Human Rights Expert Says Saudi Arabia is
Responsible
for
“Premeditated
Execution”,
OHCHR,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24713
[https://perma.cc/LVT8-FFHC] (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
2. Id.
3. Josh Lederman & Dennis Romero, CIA Concludes Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed
Bin Salman Ordered Killing of Khashoggi, NBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/cia-concludes-saudi-crown-prince-
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intelligence community accepted that conclusion, and on October
10, 2018, a bipartisan group of Senators wrote to President Trump
demanding that he make a determination of individuals to be
sanctioned for the murder of Khashoggi, in accordance with the
Global Magnitsky Act.4
On November 15, 2018, the Treasury Department announced
sanctions against several Saudi officials (not including the Crown
Prince) under the Global Magnitsky Act.56 On November 19, in an
official statement that he purportedly dictated himself, President

mohammed-bin-salman-ordered-killing-n937476
[https://perma.cc/K4NB-H6W7].
While there were later statements, including by Secretary of State Pompeo that there was
no “direct reporting” that the Crown Prince ordered the killing, the overwhelming
consensus of the intelligence community, as briefed to Congress and discussed in the press,
was that the Crown Prince was culpable in the murder. See, e.g., Warren P. Strobel, CIA
Intercepts Underpin Assessment Saudi Crown Prince Targeted Khashoggi, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 1,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cia-intercepts-underpin-assessment-saudi-crownprince-targeted-khashoggi-1543640460 [https://perma.cc/4CFK-TT43].
4. Press Release, Chairman of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Corker,
Menendez, Graham, Leahy Letter Triggers Global Magnitsky Investigation into
Disappearance
of
Jamal
Khashoggi
(Oct.
10,
2018),
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/corker-menendez-graham-leahyletter-triggers-global-magnitsky-investigation-into-disappearance-of-jamal-khashoggi
[https://perma.cc/5HFS-8JGM]. In accordance with the statute, the President was
required, within 120 days, to (1) determine whether one or more foreign persons has
engaged in or is responsible for “extrajudicial killings, torture, or other gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights”; and (2) to submit to the two leaders a classified
or unclassified report that includes “a statement of whether or not the President imposed
or intends to impose sanctions with respect to the person” along with a description of any
such sanctions. See Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, § 1263(d), 22 U.S.C.
§ 2656. See also Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Open Soc’y Just. Initiative v. Off. Dir. Nat’l
Intel., No. 1:20-cv-06625 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2020).
5. The Treasury Department announced that it had:
designated Saud al-Qahtani, his subordinate Maher Mutreb, Saudi Consul
General Mohammed Alotaibi, and 14 other members of an operations team
for having a role in the killing of Jamal Khashoggi. These individuals are
designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon
and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, to
target perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions 17 Individuals for Their
Roles
in
the
Killing
of
Jamal
Khashoggi,
(Nov.
15,
2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm547 [https://perma.cc/Q2U3-FJSV].
6. The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act permits imposition of
sanctions against any individuals “responsible for extrajudicial killings, torture, or other
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights committed against individuals
in any foreign country” who are engaging in human rights promotion, advocacy and other
protected exercises of their rights. 22 U.S.C. § 2656.
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Trump acknowledged that Khashoggi had been murdered, but
equivocated about the intelligence community’s conclusion:
It could very well be that the crown prince had knowledge of
this tragic event—maybe he did and maybe he didn’t! . . . We
may never know all of the facts surrounding the murder of Mr.
Jamal Khashoggi. In any case, our relationship is with the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. . . . I understand there are members
of Congress who, for political or other reasons, would like to
go in a different direction—and they are free to do so.7

In March 2019, the State Department complied with its
obligation under a 1976 congressional statute to release its annual
Country Reports on Human Rights,8 in which it concluded that
Saudi “[g]overnment agents carried out the killing of journalist
Jamal Khashoggi.”9 While not mentioning the role of the Crown
Prince, the report noted that the Saudi prosecutor had not “named
the suspects nor the roles allegedly played by them in the killing,
nor had they provided a detailed explanation of the direction and
progress of the investigation,” which, along with failures to punish
in other cases of alleged abuses, contributed to “an environment of
impunity.”10
What does the Khashoggi murder and its aftermath tell us
about American human rights diplomacy in the era of Trump, and
7. Donald J. Trump, Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Standing with Saudi
Arabia, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statementpresident-donald-j-trump-standing-saudi-arabia/ [https://perma.cc/JE2T-ECFW] (last
visited May 8, 2019). Later, he equivocated even more. See Kate Sullivan & Zachary Cohen,
Senate Dem on Armed Services Panel: Trump lying about CIA report on Khashoggi, CNN (Nov.
23, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/23/politics/senate-dem-armed-services-ciakhashoggi/index.html [https://perma.cc/YP2U-TDXR].
8. International Security Assistance and Armed Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2304(b); See also International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C.
§ 1515 n(d)(2).
9. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2018 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices: Saudi Arabia (2018), https://www.state.gov/reports/2018country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/saudi-arabia/
[https://perma.cc/KP42P3C3]; Courtney McBride, State Department Rights Report Blames Saudis in Death of
Khashoggi, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2019, 4:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/statedepartment-rights-report-blames-saudis-in-death-of-khashoggi-11552509726
[https://perma.cc/3WYV-YWZC]; U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab.,
2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.: Saudi Arabia (2019),
https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rightspractices/saudi-arabia/ [https://perma.cc/L84J-VXHV].
10. 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Saudi Arabia, supra note 9, at
1-2.
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what does it say about the relative roles of the Executive, Congress
and the Judiciary on the question of human rights governance? In
his excellent book Restoring the Global Judiciary,11 which is the
subject of the symposium at Fordham Law School for which I
prepared this essay, Martin Flaherty argues that the expansion of
Executive power within the US government, and the shrinking role
for Congress and the Supreme Court on issues of international law,
have diminished the United States’ role in global governance.12 His
remedy to both the expansion of Executive power and the retreat
from international governance is to return to a more powerful
Court, one that will take international law, including international
human rights law, seriously.13 I agree with Professor Flaherty that
a renewed engagement with international human rights is in the
interest of the United States.14 But to restore American
engagement, we might do well to reinvigorate the role of Congress,
not the Judiciary, as the most significant branch for human rights.
The Khashoggi incident can be viewed simply as more
evidence of the incoherence, disharmony, and chaos of the
executive branch under President Trump. It also reflects President
Trump’s personal disregard for human rights. He is a president
who does not deploy “presidential human rights talk,” the rhetoric
of human rights promotion that has infused the public diplomacy
of every president since Jimmy Carter.15 Trump denied the facts of
the murder, while he simultaneously noted its irrelevance to the
bilateral US-Saudi relationship. This illustrates that he is
untroubled both by human rights atrocities and by spreading
disinformation. Yet, while his rhetoric may have been inconsistent
with past presidencies, forging ahead with the close relationship
with the Saudi regime was generally consistent with prior
presidential approaches to human rights abuses by friendly
regimes.16 The US-Saudi relationship is an example of how human
11. MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY (2019).
12. Id. at 220-51.
13. Id. at 252-57.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Margaret E. McGuinness, Presidential Human Rights Talk, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 471
(2017).
16. In the case of Saudi Arabia in particular, the US economic and strategic
relationship with the royal family that governs the Kingdom as an absolute monarchy has
for decades taken precedence over pushing hard for political reform or the promotion of
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rights policy has worked in strategic relationships: despite known
and publicly acknowledged human rights abuses, presidents
generally opt to preserve the relationship citing national security
grounds.17 It illustrates the potential–and limits–of a more robust
congressional role in international human rights governance.
The official US government acts taken at the State and
Treasury departments after Trump’s initial statement illustrate
the entrenchment of human rights in executive branch institutions
and processes that Congress created. How is it possible that a
President can dismiss—indeed, publicly reject—the conclusions of
his own intelligence services to brush off Saudi government
responsibility for an act that violates international human rights
law, only to be followed by imposition of sanctions by his own
Treasury Department? Under what mandate or authority does the
State Department publish a report that underscores the Saudi
government’s responsibility and express official US government
concern about an “environment of impunity” when the president
has disclaimed any certain knowledge of what happened? Why
would a president, who is regarded in the US constitutional

human rights. For general overview of the strategic alliance between United States and
Saudi Arabia, see U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-saudi-arabia-relations [https://perma.cc/B2P3483F] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020). For discussion of human rights practices in Saudi Arabia
and the scope of US support for Saudi Arabia see World Report 2019: Saudi Arabia, HUM.
RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/saudi-arabia#
[https://perma.cc/NDZ4-HCXS] (last visited May 7, 2019). The State Department 2019
Country Report on Saudi Arabia describes the human rights conditions in Saudi Arabia as
follows:
Significant human rights issues included: unlawful killings; executions for
nonviolent offenses; forced disappearances; torture of prisoners and detainees
by government agents; arbitrary arrest and detention; political prisoners;
arbitrary interference with privacy; criminalization of libel, censorship, and site
blocking; restrictions on freedoms of peaceful assembly, association, and
movement; severe restrictions of religious freedom; citizens’ lack of ability and
legal means to choose their government through free and fair elections;
trafficking in persons; violence and official discrimination against women,
although new women’s rights initiatives were implemented; criminalization of
consensual same-sex sexual activity; and prohibition of trade unions.
In several cases the government did not punish officials accused of committing human
rights abuses, contributing to an environment of impunity. 2018 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices: Saudi Arabia, supra note 9, at 1-2.
17. See discussion of waivers in Part II infra.
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tradition as the “sole organ” in foreign affairs,18 invite Congress to
“go in a different direction”19 when balancing human rights
concerns against other US policy priorities? And what do these
contradictory moves suggest about the nature of American
engagement with international human rights law?
One answer to these questions lies in the unprecedented
nature of the Trump presidency: occupied by an outsider, one with
no prior public service or experience in US legal and political
institutions. Another answer is that Congress, not the President,
created and entrenched the normative practice of human rights
diplomacy. Through statutory mandate creating executive branch
agencies and offices and the annual Country Reports on Human
Rights for all foreign states, Congress has directed the means and
methods of US human rights policy. This is ironic, since, as Flaherty
chronicles in his book, Congress has served as the main obstacle to
direct, formal participation in international human rights
governance through treaties.20 Human rights diplomacy, not the
courts, has been the central tool through which the US has engaged
in the global governance of international human rights.21
This Essay is intended as a complement (and partial reply) to
Flaherty’s argument for a more robust judiciary. Part II addresses
the role Congress plays—or has the institutional capacity to play—
in human rights governance. Part III discusses the role of the Court
in giving effect to congressional human rights governance. My hope
is to illuminate the ways in which Congress can improve the role
the United States plays in international human rights governance
and contribute more effectively to state accountability and justice
in the face of gross abuses.

18. CURT BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 23-24 (2d ed. 2015)
(discussing the origins of the “sole organ” formulation).
19. Trump, supra note 7.
20. FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 224-27.
21. See Margaret E. McGuinness, Human Rights Reporting as Human Rights
Governance, 59 COL. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2021). See generally BARBARA J. KEYS,
RECLAIMING AMERICAN VIRTUE: THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION OF THE 1970S (2014); SARAH B.
SNYDER, FROM SELMA TO MOSCOW: HOW HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS TRANSFORMED U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY (2018).
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS MANDATES AS ALTERNATIVES TO HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES
Flaherty’s book is both an impressive history of and
passionate argument for the US Supreme Court’s role in
international governance. On the question of international human
rights governance, Flaherty argues that the Court—particularly in
the era of Chief Justice Roberts—has strayed from historical
practice by blocking access to American courts by human rights
claimants, and by wrongly interpreting the scope of US
international human rights obligations under treaties and statutes,
as well as the Constitution.22 I admire the tenacity and optimism of
Flaherty’s approach, and find myself largely in agreement with his
assessment of the past practices of the Court. He is not wrong to
criticize and lament the Court’s shift toward a jurisprudence that
may undermine US commitments to the international rule of law—
particularly those made in the form of treaties.23 At a time of US
withdrawal from the global stage under a president who sees little
value in the international institutions and legal regimes that have
served as useful instruments for the projection of American power
and values in the past, the Court should serve as an important
check on the Executive. But it is not the key to restoring American
leadership in global governance.24

22. FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 221-51. Current critiques of the international human
rights system abound. See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014)
(claiming that the international human rights system is almost over); Samuel Moyn, On
Human Rights and Majority Politics Keynote Articles, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1135 (2019)
(stating that the system is anti-democratic); SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN
AN UNEQUAL WORLD (2018) (stating that it has failed to achieve its purported goal of
advancing human equality); John Tasioulas, Saving Human Rights from Human Rights Law,
52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1167 (2019) (arguing that it needs to extricate itself from
international law to restore its moral grounding).
23. See, e.g., FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 227-29 (questioning the death of treaty
supremacy).
24. Advocates for continued engagement on issues such as climate change have also
turned, not surprisingly, to federalism and state and local governments as alternative
spaces in which to engage the United States in global governance. See, e.g., UNITED STATES
CLIMATE ALLIANCE, http://www.usclimatealliance.org/ [https://perma.cc/554Z-Y8AB]
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020). The United States Climate Alliance is a cooperative program
formed by New York, California and 23 other states (led by Democratic and Republican
governors) to commit to the goals of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change following the
US withdrawal from the agreement in 2017. Id.
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I start from the view—shared by Flaherty—that the United
States would benefit from more, not less, engagement with
international governance. Among other values, reengagement
would allow the US a greater voice in the much-needed reform of
international institutions. This is particularly the case for
international human rights governance.
Human rights governance is constituted by interconnected
policy-making institutions, treaty bodies, courts and commissions.
States, NGOs, corporations and individuals engage with these
governance structures to identify, elaborate and enforce
international
human
rights
norms.25
Despite
its
interconnectedness, the polycentric nature of the international
human rights system means it is not always coherent.
Fragmentation and disjunction in norm-setting and elaboration
and, often, institutional disfunction, are just some of the challenges
facing human rights governance.26 Nonetheless, the international
legal project of human rights has, over time, proved to be resilient
and a significant factor in improved conditions around the globe.27
The United States has played a leading role in creating
international human rights institutions but has been uneven in its
efforts to reform them. The Trump administration, deploying the
powerful tools of the presidency, has worked actively to
undermine their effectiveness.
To overcome the powerful presidency, Flaherty seeks to “tip
the balance” toward a less skeptical view of the role for the
judiciary in the exercise of US foreign affairs powers.28 Flaherty
25. For a discussion of the polycentric nature of human rights governance, see John
Gerard Ruggie, Global Governance and “New Governance Theory”: Lessons from Business and
Human Rights, in 20 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: A REVIEW OF MULTILATERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 5-17 (Aug. 2014). See also JIM WHITMAN, The human rights regime as global
governance, in THE FUNDAMENTALS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 139 (2009).
26. For a general critique of fragmentation and disjunction in global governance, see
Frank Biermann et al., The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework
for Analysis, GLOB. ENV'T POLITICS 9, 14-40 (2009). For critique of international human
rights governance, see STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 166-82 (2015).
For a discussion of reform in international human rights, see EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON,
MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 116, 110-21 (2013) (discussing “streamlining” the
system).
27. See generally KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK IN
THE 21ST CENTURY (2017).
28. FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 9, 251.
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sees the judiciary as important to bolstering US compliance with
international law in the face of lawless executives (like Trump),
and believes that the US should comply with international law for
instrumental reasons:
Furthermore, judicial reliance on international law
would keep the United States in compliance with its
obligation to other nations. All things being equal, such
compliance would help the country avoid conflict and
further promote peace and prosperity by demonstrating
that the republic would act as an honorable and reliable
member of the international order.29

On the more specific issue of international human rights, the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of international human rights
treaty obligations, and the effect of federal statutes on human
rights violations beyond US borders, Flaherty notes that the
practice of the Court has been “heading in the wrong direction.”30
He seeks to restore the “tools of globalization” to the Court both as
a means to improve compliance with international human rights
(which he refers to as “global norms”), but also to restore the
constitutional separation of powers on questions of foreign
policy.31
The US approach to international human rights governance
has been contradictory. Up through the Trump presidency, it
adopted a foreign policy that demands that American exercise of
its global power reflect the ideals of its constitutional democratic
origins. At the same time, the US has maintained a deep skepticism
of the projects of international law and human rights that were
established to enforce those ideals. The United States has declared
a commitment to the values of the international human rights
system and served as a leading architect of the treaties and
institutions that promote those values and norms. But the United
States has, with relative consistency, disclaimed that those same
substantive and procedural international human rights norms can
or should be applied to its own behavior—at home or abroad.
Flaherty describes this paradox as the “Janus-faced” American
29. Id. at 219.
30. Id. at 221.
31. Id. at ch. 10-11.
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approach to international human rights.32 This approach can also
be fairly described as human rights hypocrisy.
When it comes to assessing US participation in international
governance generally, and the role of the various branches in that
governance more specifically, Flaherty is unimpressed with
Congress’s record. In Flaherty’s view, Congress has not played a
meaningful role in the formulation of foreign policy and
participation in international law and governance, acting as “an
occasional check, at best” over a powerful presidency that, in
exercising foreign affairs powers, has aggregated to itself the
power to make or break international law.33
On the role of the United States in international human rights
governance, it is tempting, as Flaherty does, to dismiss Congress’s
role in checking the President, and look to the Court. Congress has
under-utilized its power to approve treaties and adopt legislation
implementing international human rights standards for the United
States. More than the presidency, Congress has been subject to the
narrow politics that often drive US skepticism of international law
making. In contrast, the Court has a natural appeal to those
concerned with giving effect to human rights abroad. The Court
played a key role in bringing about seismic changes to human
rights practices at home,34 albeit couched in the particularized
American language of, for example, “civil rights,” “criminal
procedural rights,” “free speech,” “voting rights,” “women’s rights,”
and “LGBTQ rights.”35 Litigation in US courts also has an appeal to
victims and advocacy groups who face no reasonable alternatives
because the rule of law is weak or non-existent in the places where
the rights violations occur.36 For many victims of human rights

32. Id. at 225 (describing the Eisenhower administration’s retreat from international
human rights in the face of the threatened Bricker amendments.).
33. Id. at 2.
34. Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice Annual John
Randolph Tucker Lecture, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 5 (1993).
35. When it comes to human rights at home, the United States does not generally
speak the “language” of international human rights, though that has begun to change.
36. The lure of the courts may also reflect the experiential bias of American human
rights lawyers—many of whom had participated in (or had learned from) the litigationcentered strategies of the civil rights and women’s rights movements of the 1960s and
1970s. KEYS, supra note 21, at 32-47. See also John Cerone, The ATCA at the Intersection of
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abuses outside the United States, federal court litigation is not the
“last resort” but the first and only resort to actual adjudication of
their claims. Adjudication of rights claims is a central component
of an international human rights governance system grounded in
the rule of law. Human rights victims around the globe have used
the federal courts because they have no effective alternative:
domestic redress does not exist or has been denied in the places
where the human rights abuses take place, and international
human rights institutions have proved inadequate.37
Two central constitutional powers make Congress the key
branch for engaging international human rights. First, no US
commitment to adjudication of international human rights claims
can happen without the Senate exercising its treaty power and the
full Congress implementing international human rights treaty
commitments into federal law. Second, Congress controls
appropriations, and thus the means and methods of human rights
diplomacy: US engagement with international human rights
institutions; the conditioning of assistance to foreign states; and
the use of sanctions against individuals, states, and other legal
entities.38
Exercise of the first power—treaty approval and
implementation—at least for the Roberts court, is a predicate to
any engagement of the Supreme Court in the direct adjudication
and interpretation of international human rights treaties.39 The
predicate of congressional action has been underscored by recent
cases that have expanded the scope of treaty non-self-execution,40
International Law and U.S. Law Symposium: The Bhopal Disaster Approaches 25: Looking
Back to Look Forward, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 743 (2007-2008).
37. See FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 184. These factors drove the Alien Tort Statute
litigation in US courts in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Victims who had no redress at home
or internationally viewed the ATS as an opportunity to use US law to achieve justice. See
id. at 183-87 (discussing extraterritoriality and the Alien Tort Statute). See id. at 231-37
(discussing ATS litigation generally).
38. McGuinness, supra note 21.
39. It is possible that Congress could adopt the language of a treaty into a statute that
is not, technically, an implementing statute, as it did with the Refugee Act. See infra note
46 and accompanying text. But the Roberts court is unlikely to look to international
sources in interpreting such a statute. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
CIL may also play a role, but again, the current composition of the Court makes it unlikely
to incorporate CIL into any interpretation of rights—even one incorporated into statute.
40. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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narrowed the extraterritorial application of federal statutes,41 and
generally rejected the influence of international law on the
interpretation of constitutional or statutory rights claims.42 Taken
together, these cases are a clear signal from the Court that
Congress, the reflection of popular democracy, must exercise its
powers to make international law part of domestic law. For those
concerned with the democracy deficit in international lawmaking,
this should be viewed as a positive development, even as it is seen
as a frustrating speed bump to those who value convergence in
international human rights law.
Some pessimism about Congress’s willingness to act pursuant
to this first set of powers is warranted.43 Given the fate of the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (the
“CRPD”)—the last human rights treaty to be signed by the United
States (by President George W. Bush), which failed on a Senate
floor vote—it is unlikely Congress will soon take up for approval
any of the human rights treaties the US has signed but not
ratified.44 Moreover, even in what seemed to be a relatively
uncontroversial effort to give domestic legal effect to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (the “VCCR”)—and thereby
legislatively overturn the Medellin decision—Congress failed to

41. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 569 U.S. 108 (2013); Morrison v.
National Australia Bank, Ltd. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
42. See FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 240-51 (addressing the question of judicial
borrowing from foreign and international law sources). For an example of nonenforcement of itnernational law through statutory interpretation, see Bond v. United
States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014) (applying clear statement rule to dismiss claim brought under
the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementing Statute). There are ways in which
international human rights standards can be introduced into federal law without treaty
commitments, in the same way the language of human rights treaties is incorporated into
state and local law. As Professor Ashley Deeks has demonstrated, international law that is
not implementing a treaty obligation of the United States is sprinkled throughout the
United States Code, representing a kind of customary international law practice of the
United States. See Ashley Deeks, Statutory International Law, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 263 (2017).
43. FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 231. Professor Flaherty is refreshingly blunt: “Relying
on today’s polarized Congress for much of anything, much less incorporating human rights
obligations, might seem like an idle hope,” but he admits that, “[t]he legislature can still,
from time to time, surprise.” Id.
44. See Josh Rogin, Senate GOP rejects U.N. disabilities treaty, FOREIGN POL'Y (Dec. 2,
2012),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/12/04/senate-gop-rejects-u-n-disabilitiestreaty/ [https://perma.cc/KT4C-96UD].
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act.45 As Professor Flaherty notes, there are only a handful of bright
spots where Congress has directly implemented international
human rights law: the Refugee Act and Anti-Torture Act, which
create obligations on state actors, and the Torture Victim
Protection Act and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, which
create civil liabilities under federal law.46
But in contrast to Professor Flaherty’s general pessimism
about Congress, I see Congress as institutionally capable of
steering US human rights governance through the second set of
powers: human rights policy appropriations and oversight.
Though not the subject of Flaherty’s book, these powers are
essential to assessing the full scope of US engagement in
international human rights governance. Indeed, in light of the
Court’s reluctance to serve as a check on presidential excesses and
its turn away from giving effect to international law in its
jurisprudence, Congress is essential to rebalancing US
commitments to international human rights law. Fortunately,
Congress already has all the tools it needs at its disposal.
US foreign policy began taking human rights seriously in the
mid-1970s, with Congress, in the face of a reluctant Ford
administration, taking the lead.47 The congressional human rights
mandates were legislation designed to restrain the ability of the
President to support and promote regimes and policies that
amounted to “gross abuses of internationally recognized human
rights.”48 These congressional human rights mandates ushered in
the era of American human rights diplomacy, proceeding on a
separate track from the international human rights treaty

45. See H.R. 6481, 110th Congress (2008) (the stated purpose was “[t]o create a civil
action to provide judicial remedies to carry out certain treaty obligations of the United
States under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and the Optional Protocol to
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.”).
46. Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, § 1108; Anti-Torture Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A; Torture
Victims Protection Act, 28 U.S.C.§ 1350; FLAHERTY supra note 11, at 231.
47. SNYDER, supra note 21, at 148-67. See also Daniel Sargent, Oasis in the Desert?
America’s Human Rights Discovery, in THE BREAKTHROUGH 125 (Jan Eckel & Samuel Moyn
eds., 2013).
48. The first statute to incorporate this language into binding legislation was the
International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1975).
For a full discussion of the legislation, see David Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and
U.S. Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 231 (1977).
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institutions the United States remained outside.49 Political support
for congressional action on human rights was part of broader
Watergate and Vietnam-era concerns about executive branch
overreach, at home and abroad.50 The human rights mandates
reflected a growing view among the American public that foreign
policy should reflect American virtues and its best values, and
disassociate itself from the dark images of American complicity in
war crimes and atrocities in Vietnam, and also from those carried
out by allies in Greece, Chile, and Korea.51 Just as important, the
mandates were part of a broader reassertion of congressional
constitutional prerogatives against what was an increasingly
powerful presidency on issues of national security and foreign
policy.52
For effective human rights governance, what other states do
in the face of non-compliance by a state (or non-state actors,
including individuals) has mattered as much as the work of
domestic or international courts and commissions.53 States wield
political and legal tools to reward or punish behavior of other
states, including for noncompliance with international law, and
have adopted these tools for the human rights era.54 Rewards may
come in the form of: membership and access to club goods in
defense, trade and/or investment agreements; cash transfers
(loans, access to financing at international financial institutions,
direct humanitarian assistance); military assistance (access to
weapons, training and cooperation); and/or support for

49. For a full discussion of this development, see Weissbrodt, supra note 48.
50. See SNYDER, supra note 21, at 148-67. See also KEYS, supra note 21, at 48-74.
51. See KEYS, supra note 21, at 75-102. See also SNYDER, supra note 21, at 60-147.
52. Louis Henkin made the case for a stronger congressional role in testimony in
support of the Murphy Commission proposals to reform the State Department. Louis
Henkin, "A More Effective System” for Foreign Relations: The Constitutional Framework, 61
VA. L. REV. 751 (1975).
53. Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound Lecture: Transnational Legal Process,
75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 194-205 (1996) (articulating how the interactions of states constitute
a central dimension of "transnational legal process" that leads to state compliance with
human rights). See also Emilie M. Hafner‐Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a
Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. OF SOCIO. 1373 (2005).
54. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, The Power Politics of Regime Complexity: Human Rights
Trade Conditionality, in Europe, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 33 (2009).
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commercial, cultural and other relations.55 Penalties may range
from withholding of rewards to more active sanctions targeted at
institutions of a foreign state’s government, to individual
sanctions.56 For the United States, the congressional human rights
mandates operate as shared congressional-executive powers,
deploying these tools to regulate human rights.
In the past 45 years, Congress has passed dozens of statutes
and amendments that together constitute the congressional
human rights mandates. These include: the original legislation
mandating annual human rights reporting, along with several
amendments broadening the scope of that reporting;57 conditions
attached to the Foreign Military Sales Act (for governmental arms
transfers) and the Arms Export Control Act (for private military
sales to foreign governments);58 expansion of sanctions legislation
aimed to punish governments, non-state actors, and individuals
who engage in human rights violations;59 legislation creating
particular human rights offices and positions within the state
department and elsewhere in the executive branch, and also
congressional
and
congressional-executive
commissions
addressing human rights issues.60
55. ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS, A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 2570 (2008).
56. In the United States, Congress delegated to the President the powers to take
broad decisions on economic sanctions under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1977).
57. The original “sense of Congress” resolution conditioning assistance on human
rights compliance was passed in 1974. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559,
§ 46, 88 Stat. 1795, 1815 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (Supp. IV 1974)). The
first reporting requirement was added when the aid conditionality was passed into
binding law in 1975. 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d) (Supp. V 1975) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 94-161,
§ 310, 88 Stat. 849, 860). The first Country Reports were published to Congress in 1977.
For a discussion of the first reports submitted, see Weissbrodt, supra note 48.
58. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (1976). The year following the amendments to the AECA,
conditions were also attached to the International Development and Food Assistance Act.
22 U.S.C. § 2151n(d)(2) (1977).
59. See, e.g., discussion of the Leahy Law and the Global Magnitsky Act, infra note 73
and accompanying text. Sanctions legislation has been extensive, frequently operating as
a delegation of presidential discretion under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (“IEEPA”). 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
60. See 22 U.S.C. § 2651(a). The State Department Office of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs was created during the Ford Presidency and upgraded to the Bureau
of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in 1977, under President Carter. See SNYDER,
supra note 21. It was renamed the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in 1993.
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Beyond the year-to-year appropriations leverage that
Congress holds, these long-standing mandates created ongoing
monitoring, reporting, and sanctions requirements that have
proved durable governance mechanisms. Their durability is a
result of several characteristics: (1) they are mandatory and
permanent (they require monitoring, reporting and staffing at the
State Department beyond the current fiscal year);61 (2) they
incorporate international human rights law, not US constitutional
standards, as the means of measuring and assessing other states’
human rights practice;62 and (3) they are the result, generally, of
bipartisan consensus that the United States should be promoting
human rights in its foreign policy, even where the parties may
disagree as to the priorities and content of particular rights.63
Perhaps most important, the mandates have endured because they
contain flexibility in the form of waiver provisions, through which
any conditionality or hold on appropriations designated for a
foreign state can be waived by the president upon certification of a
national security need.64 In short, while the monitoring and
See 22 U.S.C. § 2304. Congress created its own Human Rights Commission, The Lantos
Human Rights Commission, as a formal follow on to the creation Congressional Human
Rights Caucus, created in 1983. See H.R. Res. 1451, 110th Cong. (2008) (passed by
unanimous consent); David P. Forsythe, Congress and Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy:
The Fate of General Legislation, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 382 (1987). In 2000, Congress created an
Executive-Congressional Commission on China, to monitor and address human rights
conditions. H.R. 4444, 106th Cong. (2000). It created the US Commission on International
Religious Freedom as part of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. 22 U.S.C. §
6411.
61. See 22 U.S.C. § 2651(a).
62. See 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a); 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a); see also International Religious
Freedom Act of 1998, PUB. L. NO. 105-292, 112 STAT. 2787, § 2(a)(3) (referencing Article
18 of the UDHR as well as the ICCPR).
63. Adam Schiff and Mike Pence co-sponsored the Daniel Pearl Act, which amended
the requirements of the Annual Country Reports to include a section on press freedoms.
See Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-166, 124 STAT. 1186.
64. The 1974 Sense of Congress resolution used the language “except in exceptional
circumstances” to describe when security assistance might continue notwithstanding
gross human rights abuses. The current general language reads that Congress must be
informed:
[W]hether, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, notwithstanding any such
practices—
(i) extraordinary circumstances exist which necessitate a continuation
of security assistance for such country, and, if so, a description of such
circumstances and the extent to which such assistance should be continued
(subject to such conditions as Congress may impose under this section), and
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reporting mandates are non-waivable, the “sticks and carrots” of
human rights diplomacy—the withholding of aid or imposition of
sanctions—are waivable.
The criticism of such presidential “waivers,” whereby a
congressional statutory mandate contains a loophole that permits
full authority of a president to waive the statutory requirements
upon the meeting of certain conditions, is that they undermine
Congress’s lawmaking authority, and generally do not include
requirements for procedurally sound justifications for waiver.65 In
the human rights context, such waivers may be criticized for
permitting the president to downgrade the role of international
human rights compliance in strategically valuable bilateral
relationships, and in particular contexts, such as counter-terrorism
operations.66 Under this view, waivers are detrimental to the
broader project of human rights governance: if human rights are to
be prioritized and foreign assistance conditionality used to coerce
good practices and punish bad practices, waivers undermine the
central purpose of the mandates.
The waiver provisions should be seen, however, as a feature—
with limits. The waiver provisions were much discussed, and
facilitated the original passage of human rights mandates, and
many subsequent amendments.67 As David Barron and Todd
Rakoff have concluded about a variety of presidential waiver
provisions, the waiver provisions assist in encouraging Congress
to pass legislation that is more aggressive and bolder than that
which they might have originally considered.68 Because the waiver
(ii) on all the facts it is in the national interest of the United States to provide
such assistance.
22 U.S.C. § 2304(c)(1)(C) (2018).
65. For general critique of the lack of objective criteria for presidential factfinding,
see Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 825 (2019). For a defense of
such waiver provisions, see David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013).
66. For an early critique of the original legislation, see Forsythe, supra note 60.
67. See, e.g., Veto Message from the President of the United States Returning Without
Approval the Bill (S. 2662) Entitled An Act to Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
and the Foreign Military Sales Act, and for Other Purposes, Sen. Doc. No. 94-185 at III (2d
Sess. 1976) (pointing to lack of executive discretion as a reason for vetoing the original
bill).
68. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 65 (stating a waiver provision “[a]llows Congress to
codify policy preferences it might otherwise be unwilling to enact.”).
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provisions preserve presidential discretion in strategic
relationships, they have resulted in a general pattern of executive
compliance with the reporting mandates.69 The waiver provisions
require transparency about what a president does when he
declares
the
national
security
interest
paramount,
notwithstanding official reports of human rights abuses.70
Moreover, the waiver provision only applies to presidential
certifications on aid expenditures.71 Waivers do not apply to the
monitoring and reporting requirements, which ensures that factfinding done at the State Department is kept separate from waiver
determinations at the White House.72 This has the effect of
clarifying, for Congress and the broader public, that aid is being
approved by the president notwithstanding human rights
problems. It also has the effect, over time, of reducing the tendency
of presidents to downplay human rights problems of strategic
allies.73 In some cases, it has prompted Congress to amend the
prior reporting and sanctions statutes to narrow such waivers in
the future.74 By decoupling monitoring and reporting from
69. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2019 Country Reports on
Human
Rights
Practices,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
STATE
(Mar.
11,
2020),
https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/
[https://perma.cc/4YM6-SJV8] (discussing compliance since 1977 with the annual
reporting).
70. See 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (providing that military assistance and military sales
licenses will be prohibit to states in that abuse human rights human rights “unless the
President certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that extraordinary
circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance [or license].”). See also
Weissbrodt, supra note 48.
71. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2).
72. See 22 U.S.C. § 2304(b) (outlining reporting requirements).
73. For an early discussion of the tendency of presidents to downplay abuses in
strategic allies, see Scott Horton & Randy Sellier, The Utility of Presidential Certifications of
Compliance with United States Human Rights Policy: The Case of El Salvador, Commentary,
1982 WIS. L. REV. 825 (1982).
74. Amendments to the original Congressional Human Rights Mandates (CHRMs)
have been plentiful. For example, the Leahy Law was adopted as 1997 and 1999
amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), 22 U.S.C. § 2378(d) (which applies to the
State Department), and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 10 U.S.C. § 362 (which applies
to the Department of Defense) to prohibit US assistance to any foreign security forces unit
where the United States has “credible information that the unit has committed a gross
violation of human rights.” The Magnitsky Act was passed to identify and impose sanctions
on individuals involved in the murder of Russian journalist Sergei Magnitsky as well as
“other gross human rights violations committed against individuals exposing illegal
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decisions about aid and sanctions, the waiver provisions have
helped to make monitoring and reporting valuable, and generally
reliable, governance tools.
Waivers are not the only challenge to congressional oversight
in this area. Signing statements represent a particular challenge to
congressional oversight powers, as they tend to suggest that the
ultimate, and exclusive, interpretation of the scope of shared
congressional-executive authority in foreign affairs lies with the
President.75 In recent confrontations over the full scope of
congressional power to subpoena documents and testimony from
the President, the Court has left open some questions regarding the
ability of Congress to enforce such oversight.76 Most challenging,
perhaps, is a presidential veto, which operates as a formal limit on
congressional lawmaking. In circumstances when either the House
activity of the Russian government.” Russia and Moldova Jackson-Vanik Repeal and Sergei
Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act (Magnitsky Act) of 2012, 22 U.S.C. § 5811(n).
75. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS
AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE 5 (2006) (arguing they are an unconstitutional
practice); Robert Pear, Legal Group Says Bush Undermines Law by Ignoring Select Parts of
Bills,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
24,
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/24/washington/24prexy.html
[https://perma.cc/9XJQ-MF3K]. For an early critique of signing statements, see Marc N.
Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative
Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363 (1987). But see
Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006) (arguing that signing statements are constitutional,
potentially helpful as a signal to statutory interpretation, and not an institutional challenge
to separation of powers). Scholars have concluded that signing statements have been less
successful in influencing the ways in which courts interpret legislation. See, e.g., John M de
Figueiredo & Edward H Stiglitz, Signing Statements and Presidentializing Legislative
History 1-41 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 23951, 2017).
76. See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020); see also Trump v. Vance,
140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020). Both these cases concerned the challenge of seeking personal
information (tax returns) of the person occupying the presidency, which raises the issue
of the “two bodies” in each presidency: the person and the office of the Presidency. As
Daphna Renan has commented, the two-bodies prism can elucidate the controversy at the
crux of the subpoena cases: Mazars is rooted in the principle that the two bodies are
inextricable, their boundaries difficult to define. Vance cautions, however, that public law
must not entirely collapse them. In this sense, the duality provides a normative
justification for both opinions. Daphna Renan, Mazars, Vance and the President’s Two
Bodies, LAWFARE (July 22, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/mazars-vance-andpresidents-two-bodies [https://perma.cc/E4CW-86XD]. In the case of congressional
oversight of human rights, the body implicated is generally that of the office of the
presidency. However, the entanglement of President Trump’s personal interests with
those of foreign states and their leaders may complicate this question in foreign policy
oversight as well.
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or Senate is closely split on a particular issue, bipartisanship may
not be enough to overcome it. This played out in the final challenge
to President Trump on the Khashoggi issue, which by 2019 became
explicitly linked to US support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen.77
In July 2019, Congress passed legislation which would have
prohibited arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States.78
Trump vetoed the legislation,79 and Congress failed to garner the
votes necessary to override the veto.80
The Khashoggi case illustrates where Congress will draw the
line on gross human rights abuses, even—or perhaps especially—
when carried out by a strategic ally whose general behavior has
caused moral outrage in the American electorate. The fact that the
United States government was in possession of incontrovertible
evidence of the murder of Khashoggi at the hands of the Saudi
government made it less palatable for Congress to acquiesce to any
administration stonewalling or soft peddling. But the case also
illustrates, ultimately, the limits of congressional power in the face
of a president unconcerned about human rights and willing to push
presidential constitutional power to its limits. The judiciary, in this
context, becomes essential to rebalancing the separation of powers
and enforcing congressional oversight. But is there a separate role

77. See Catie Edmondson, House Votes to Block Arms Sales to Gulf Nations, Setting Up
Trump’s
Third
Veto,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
17,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/us/politics/saudi-arms-vote.html
[https://perma.cc/49KD-QQYG] (“Lawmakers in both parties have been incensed that the
president has done nothing to punish the kingdom for the grisly killing of Jamal Khashoggi,
a Saudi dissident and Virginia-based Washington Post columnist, even after the Central
Intelligence Agency concluded that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ordered the
killing.”).
78. Ethan Kessler, Trump Vetoes Challenge to Arab Arms Sales, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N
(Sept.
2019),
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/news/trump-vetoeschallenge-arab-arms-sales [https://perma.cc/H36W-XMQW].
79. Karoun Demirjian et al., Trump Vetoes Congress’s Attempt to Block Arms Sales to
Saudi
Arabia,
WASH.
POST
(July
24,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-vetoes-congresss-attempt-to-blockarms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/2019/07/24/7b047c32-ae65-11e9-a0c96d2d7818f3da_story.html [https://perma.cc/M8KZ-Z9RM].
80. Senate Fails to Override Trump vetoes of bills stopping Saudi weapons sales,
REUTERS (July 29, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-arms/senatefails-to-override-trump-vetoes-of-bills-stopping-saudi-weapons-sales-idUSKCN1UO2BN
[https://perma.cc/2Z64-XTND].
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for the judiciary in enforcing congressional human rights
governance?
III. CONGRESSIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MANDATES IN THE COURTS
Professor Flaherty laments that the Court has closed the
proverbial courthouse door to international human rights
litigation in federal courts.81 The Court’s narrow role in
international human rights adjudicatory governance is a logical
consequence of the United States’ decision not to join many of the
central human rights treaties. Further, it is the consequence of the
attachment to those treaties it did join of the so-called
reservations, understandings and declarations (“RUDs”), which
render the treaties obligations of international law, but without
effect in domestic law.82 The United States is a party to several
other treaties that can be said to include human rights obligations,
such as the VCCR, which incorporates international standards into
the arrest and detention of foreign nationals.83 The Court has
determined that even a binding adjudication clause in the VCCR is
not self-executing, thus removing the federal courts from the
international adjudication and enforcement process.84 One of the
few bright spots of judicial participation in international
governance that Flaherty briefly mentions is the Court’s approach
to US obligations under the Refugee Convention of 1951 and its
Protocol of 1967.85 It is here that Congress’s authority to

81. FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 220-30.
82. But see David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-SelfExecuting Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999).
83. See The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Oct.
1, 1991). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights tied the consular notification right in
Art. 36 of the VCCR to the international human rights guarantee of due process. Id.
84. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008). The Court has also signaled that
federalism may provide an additional obstacle to treaty enforcement against individuals,
even where Congress has adopted implementing legislation. See Bond v. United States, 572
U.S. 844 (2014). Concurring opinions of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito noted that some
treaty subject matter, even where approved as an Art. II Treaty by the Senate, and
subsequently implemented through bicameral legislation, may not be compatible with
federalism principles. Bond, 572 U.S. 844.
85. The central international human rights obligations relating to refugees and
asylum seekers are found in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 and the Protocol of 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 7 (1967). The United States
became a party to the Protocol in 1968. The Refugee Act was passed into law in 1980 (since
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implement an international human rights obligation, which it
exercised when it enacted the Refugee Act of 1980 and subsequent
amendments to US immigration law, has been amplified by
Congress’s creation of human rights reporting obligations.
Asylum cases arise when foreign nationals claim a “wellfounded fear of persecution” and request non-refoulement (nonreturn to the place of origin) and the right of protection (i.e.,
permission to remain temporarily or permanently) in the United
States.86 The United States immigration courts make
determinations of claims for asylum, as well as non-refoulement
claims that arise from US obligations under the Convention Against
Torture.87 In reviewing these claims, and any appeals of those
claims through the Board of Immigration Review and the federal
appeals courts, both asylum seekers and the government in a
significant number of cases come to rely on the Country Reports to
support or rebut a claim for asylum.
For almost four decades, asylum cases in the United States
cited the State Department reports in support of claims about
human rights conditions abroad. Between 1980 and 2017, over
4,000 reported federal asylum cases cited the Country Reports as
evidence (through judicial notice) of human rights conditions on
the ground in the country of origin of the asylum seeker.88 Former
amended) and incorporated the basic protections of the Convention and Protocol into US
immigration law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et. seq.
86. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158.
87. Id.; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Apr. 18, 1988, 94 T.I.A.S. 1120.1, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. See also
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, PUB. L. NO. 105-292, 112 STAT. 2787 § 2(a)(3)
(adding to the religious persecution elements for non-refoulement, creating a separate
statutory claim).
88. A review of the case law demonstrates the increased use of the reports (1) over
time, and (2) as the reports expanded in depth and breadth of issues covered. Between
1980 and 1985, only six asylum cases (out of 134) reference the Country Reports. Six cases
(out of 172) discussed the report between 1985 and 1990; 203 cases (out of 1,152)
between 1990 and 2000; 2,445 (out of 16,719 cases) between 2000 and 2010; and 1,405
cases (out of 7,177) between 2010 and 2017. (Data on file with author.) As the reports
became a permanent feature of international human rights facts finding, they were used in
a variety of national court and international court, commission, and committee settings.
See McGuinness, supra note 21. See also Humanitarian-based Immigration Resources, DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/humanitarian-based-immigration-resources
[https://perma.cc/J6AJ-DCW7] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020) (listing the Country Reports as
“additional government resources”). DHS included the most recent Country Reports
release in their blog. See Kendall Scherr, State Department Releases reports on Human
Rights
Practices,
HOMELAND
SEC.
DIGIT.
LIBR.
(Mar.
13,
2020),
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Judge Richard Posner, in two separate opinions, criticized
“overreliance” on the reports, particularly by the government,
noting that they are “anonymous” and therefore restrict the ability
of asylum seekers to cross-examine them.89 He expressed the
“perennial concern that the Department soft pedals human rights
violations by countries that the United States wants to have good
relations with.”90 The risk of politicization of the reporting has
always hung over the reporting process. Over time, however, even
the human rights NGO community began to trust the Country
Reports as a reliable source of factual reporting from which to
draw legal conclusions about a state’s compliance with its human
rights obligations. 91
The courts themselves grapple with the human rights
questions at the heart of asylum claims: has the asylum seeker
suffered a human rights violation that would meet the general
criteria of a “well-founded fear of persecution” based on “race,
religion, nationality, and/or membership in a particular social
group or political opinion?”92 As a matter of factual and legal
adjudication, asylum claims are no more or less complex than any
other adjudication of human rights claims brought in domestic or
international courts. Courts in asylum cases address hard
questions of fact and law, and may reach inconsistent results.93
What is notable in these cases is the influential role of the work
product of the executive branch created under the congressional
mandates, and the fact that they have guided the adjudication in
many cases.
Moreover, adjudication of claims of refugees is a component
of global human rights governance. The act of granting asylum
represents both a factual and legal determination that the acts of
one state toward a person or group of people was in breach of
https://www.hsdl.org/c/state-department-releases-reports-on-human-rights-practices/
[https://perma.cc/G3XS-AV5C].
89. Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 658 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Gailius v. INS, 147, F.3d
34, 46 n.7 (1st Cir. 1998)).
90. Gramatikov v. INS, 128 F.3d 619, 620 (7th Cir. 1997).
91. See McGuinness, supra note 21.
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
93. Inconsistency raises questions of both fairness within the US legal system, as well
as general US compliance with the obligations of international refugee law. See Jaya RamjiNogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. R. 295
(2007).
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international human rights law. A grant of asylum represents the
direct implementation of an international human rights law
obligation of the United States. The rights at issue are enjoyed by
non-citizens and claimed in response to persecution that takes
place outside the United States. It is thus a form of indirect
horizontal governance across borders, aided by the direct vertical
governance of statutorily adopted treaty obligations. Congress’s
role here can be viewed as both direct governance, in
implementing the treaty obligation, and indirect, in creating the
Country Reports, which are then provided as evidence to the courts
to facilitate adjudication of a claim about non-compliance of
foreign states with their international human rights obligations.94
Asylum law has served as a mechanism of protection of individuals,
but also of opprobrium of the human rights behavior of foreign
states, even those that have disclaimed formal human rights treaty
membership.
What the refugee cases make clear is that human rights
governance is both political and legal. Placing faith in the Court to
re-orient American engagement with international law and
governance needs to acknowledge the ways in which the blending
of law and politics will also play out in the Court. Indeed, one way
to view the historical dimensions of Professor Flaherty’s book is to
track the Court’s turn away from enforcement of international law
and human rights to trends in the Court’s overall composition. The
Court’s more conservative wing has been consistently on the side
of closing the courthouse door to claims based in treaties or
customary international law, and to narrowing extraterritorial
application of statutes, while the liberal wing has generally been
more open to those cases, as well as to allowing international
human rights law to influence constitutional rights
interpretation.95
94. Not all asylum cases rely on Country Reports. Other fact-finding, by NGOs, civil
society, journalists and direct witnesses in particular cases, are also frequently relied on
to supplement or undermine the testimony of the asylum seeker. See McGuinness, supra
note 21.
95. Late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg is an example of a liberal Justice willing to apply
international law in cases. See Chris Borgen, Justice Ginsburg and Secretary of State Rice at
the ASIL; More on Citation to Foreign Sources by U.S. Courts, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 04, 2005),
http://opiniojuris.org/2005/04/04/justice-ginsburg-and-secretary-of-state-rice-at-theasil-more-on-citation-to-foreign-sources-by-us-courts/ [https://perma.cc/JLU4-9RAL].
About Ginsberg, Sean D. Murphy wrote “[t]o cite but one example, in her concurring
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Politics at the Court runs head on into Professor Flaherty’s
central claim that the United States and the world benefit from
more, not less, American participation in global governance.96 The
conservative wing of the Court largely disagrees with this
proposition.97 According to Republican party orthodoxy and the
so-called Trump Doctrine, prosperity and peace are best served by
treating international relations with more politics and less law.98 I
agree that more, rather than less, engagement in global systems of
governance is better for the United States and, generally speaking,
for the management of international relations and disputes. But
given the shift in Court politics and doctrine, it may not be the
branch poised to restore American global governance, even if—as
Flaherty so convincingly lays out—it once endorsed it.
To the degree that the United States participates in the nonadjudicatory, diplomatic elements of international human rights
governance, the Court will have no role in adjudication of any
issues arising in those fora. That is, in part, due to the moves made
by the Supreme Court on issues of standing and justiciability that
Flaherty critiques.99 Any challenges to the ways in which Congress
opinion on race-conscious university admissions policies in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 344 (2003), she turned to both the Convention on Racial Discrimination (to which the
United States is a party) and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (to which it is not) as guidance for considering the meaning of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Remembering RBG, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L.,
https://www.asil.org/rememberingRBG [https://perma.cc/R5L6-DA9F] (last visited Oct.
15, 2020). Justice Stephen Breyer provides another example. See Justice Stephen Breyer,
Address at the Am. Soc’y of Int’l L., (Apr. 4, 2003) (transcript available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_04-04-03
[https://perma.cc/2XXL-SH9L]).
96. See FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 19.
97. The late justice Scalia was a standard-bearer for the anti-globalist stance on
issues of constitutional interpretation. See Melissa A. Waters, Justice Scalia on the Use of
Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: Unidirectional Monologue or Co-Constitutive
Dialogue Symposium Issue: International Law and the 2003-04 Supreme Court Term:
Building Bridges or Constructing Barriers between National, Foreign, and International Law,
12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 149 (2004–2005). See also William Dodge, Justice Scalia on
Foreign
Law
and
the
Constitution,
OPINIO
Juris,
http://opiniojuris.org/2006/02/22/justice-scalia-on-foreign-law-and-the-constitution/
[https://perma.cc/LHL4-WPPD] (last accessed Oct. 15. 2020). For more examples of
conservative stances, see Chief Justice Roberts' decisions in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(2008) and Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014).
98. Michael Anton, The Trump Doctrine: An insider explains the president's foreign
policy, FOREIGN POL'Y (Apr. 20, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/20/the-trumpdoctrine-big-think-america-first-nationalism/ [https://perma.cc/WEZ7-W6MM].
99. FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 173-81.
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and the President share human rights governance powers, as well
as any challenges brought by one branch against the other, are
those most likely to fail on standing, justiciability and other
grounds for non-adjudication or dismissal of claims.100 As a result,
complex questions of legal compliance with international human
rights norms—as they are applied to the United States—are left to
non-adjudicatory institutions. Politics and civil society move in to
fill the gap when the courts have a reduced role, picking and
choosing among international human rights norms that can be
“brought home” to local, state or even federal law.101 Once
international law “comes home” and becomes part of domestic
politics and law making, the Court’s role is not as a global court, but
as a national court adjudicating claims arising under the
Constitution or statute. In short, the more the United States
participates in non-treaty international human rights governance,
the less likely it is that the Supreme Court will be involved in
adjudicatory international human rights governance.
There is an important limitation to this argument. By treating
all international human rights as a question of foreign policy, or
even foreign legal policy, it frames international human rights as
an issue of how the United States should behave in its relations
with other states and institution outside its borders. This is a frame
of human rights policy as external governance. Such an approach
ignores how the United States governs questions of human rights
at home, including whether international human rights
jurisprudence should influence constitutional interpretation at the
Court.102 The challenge faced by this approach is that it attempts to
draw a bright line between what we mean by “external” human
rights and “internal” human rights. Drawing this line has never
been entirely successful, even in the United States.103 Since the
100. Id.
101. See Koh, supra note 53 (describing the role for non-state actors in transnational
legal process). For an example of activist efforts to bring international human rights law
into US law at the state and local level, see Human Rights Institute, State and Local
Implementation of Human Rights, COLUM. L. SCH., https://web.law.columbia.edu/humanrights-institute/human-rights-us/state-and-local-implementation
[https://perma.cc/W75Z-8T5P] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). For a discussion of NGOs and
civil society, see HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 26, at 151-63.
102. FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 242-51. See also McGuinness, supra note 21.
103. See generally CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE (2003). For a history of the
ways in which Cold War politics extinguished hope of linking the fight for racial equality
in the United States to the burgeoning UN human rights system, see id. at 5 (“The Cold War
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beginning of the post-World War II era of international
governance, the idea of international human rights has sought to
modify the nature of two central principles of international law:
non-interference in internal matters, and the principle of
international law as consensual form of law making.104 As a matter
of foreign policy, the United States has attempted to navigate this
space by arguing that the American constitutional order is in
harmony with the general goals and approach of international
human rights law, while also refusing to consent to supranational
governance of that internal human rights order.105
That position was never entirely defensible, but it has become
increasingly untenable in the last two decades as the US domestic
rights behavior has come under international scrutiny. Ironically,
it is through governance of monitoring and reporting that the
United States promoted within the UN and regional human rights
bodies that US behavior has been assessed.106 The external means
and methods of measuring human rights behaviors have “come
home” to the United States in ways that the US government had
hoped to block by not joining human rights treaties or attaching
non-self-executing reservations to them.107 In this light, Congress
is a complementary governing mechanism to international human
rights political governance, as well as to international and
domestic adjudication of rights. It has been through the human
rights diplomacy of the congressional mandates, not the federal
courts, that the United States has had the most influence and
also systematically eliminated human rights as a viable option for mainstream African
American Leadership.”).
104. Since the founding of the UN, the conflict between human rights and noninterference under Art. 2 (7) had been highly contested. See Maziar Jamnejad & Michael
Wood, The Principle of Non-Intervention, 22 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 345 (2009). See also Andrea
Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L L. 491 (2008)
(discussing the relationship between customary international human rights law and jus
cogens norms).
105. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (2005).
106. See, e.g., Universal Periodic Review – United States of America – Reference
Documents,
OCHR,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRUSStakeholdersInfoS9.aspx
[https://perma.cc/674A-9ULJ] (last visited Oct. 15, 2020). See also Jamil Dakwar, In an
Unprecedented No-Show, the U.S. Pulls Out of Planned Human Rights Hearing, ACLU BLOG
(Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/blog/human-rights/unprecedented-no-show-uspulls-out-planned-human-rights-hearing [https://perma.cc/H68V-9KWP] (assessing US
human rights practices at the inter-American Commission of Human Rights).
107. See Sloss, supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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impact on the international human rights system. Whether the
influence of American human rights diplomacy endures, will
depend on the political branches, not the courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the Constitution designed, Congress cannot engage in any
foreign policy—including human rights governance—on its own.
Foreign affairs powers are shared with the president, and the
president holds the constitutional authority to carry out the
foreign policy of the United States. Moreover, congressional human
rights governance has not always meant congressional human
rights dominance. At times, the active participation of Congress in
international human rights governance has been more prominent
than the Executive, and at other times it has taken a back seat to
presidential agenda-setting. Over time, the interaction between
presidential and congressional human rights policy-making has
operated as a kind of feedback loop, with one or the other branch
acting or reacting to the initiatives of the other. Where a president
is hostile to international human rights, as with the Trump
administration, there may be additional significant limits to
congressional power.
Congressional human rights mandates have endured because
American presidents of the modern era have generally embraced
international human rights as an ideal and a framework through
which to legitimize their own foreign policy agendas. Presidents of
both parties have generally rejected formal membership in
international human rights treaties and institutions. Yet up until
the Trump administration, presidents of both parties have used
human rights diplomacy as a tool to frame US behavior, rebut
claims of amorality in foreign policy, and deploy as a cudgel against
so-called strategic competitors. Indeed, the breadth, scope and
malleability of the phrase “international human rights” has
allowed it to be used by different presidents for different purposes.
This permits presidents to differ on such issues as which rights are
fundamental, what is the hierarchy of rights protection, and which
rights demand protection of law and which are merely part of
moral, cultural or religious commitments of particular societies.
For those depending on international human rights law to
provide the content of substantive rights and mechanisms for their
enforcement, these distinctions are not insignificant. But the
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Trump era represents a jarring break from any rhetorical
commitment to human rights—whether a legal or moral claim—
by the President. As I have argued elsewhere, Trump has
abandoned the typical “presidential human rights talk,” and has
instead embraced and excused the worst human rights behavior of
foes (North Korea, China) and allies (Saudi Arabia, Turkey,
Hungary) alike in equal measure, while downplaying the virtues of
rule-of-law democracies with good human rights records (e.g.,
Canada, Germany).108 This lack of human rights talk extends to
domestic human rights issues as well. The erosion of rule of law
and human rights norms at home under the Trump
administration—also accompanied by personal presidential
rhetoric that has been described as coming from “the authoritarian
playbook”—deepens the fissure between the United States and the
ideals of international human rights governance.
If it were ever true that the United States speaks with “one
voice” when it comes to foreign affairs, the Trump turnabout on
human rights rhetoric might mark an endpoint to US human rights
diplomacy. But the United States has never spoken with “one voice”
on the subject of international human rights. Indeed, since the
beginning of the international human rights era in the 1950s, the
United States has spoken with multiple voices, which have only
infrequently been in harmony with one another.109 Any effective
restoration of a robust role for the United States in human rights
governance will require a president who returns to a rhetorical
commitment to human rights—or at least does not actively seek to
undermine human rights. Such presidential policy is necessary but
not sufficient to meaningful human rights governance. At the
national level, it has been Congress, not the judiciary, that has
served to both hamper and promote the role of the United States
in
international
human
rights
governance.
Without
appropriations, active oversight of executive branch human rights
diplomacy, and other congressional lawmaking in support of
robust human rights governance, a return to presidential
leadership on human rights will fall short. Congress holds the keys
108. McGuinness, Presidential Human Rights Talk, supra note 15.
109. The dissonance has been between the political branches, but also between the
federal government and the states. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism:
Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States Social
Movements and Law Reform, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001–2002).
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to any restoration of US leadership in human rights governance.
And the Khashoggi case is recent evidence that, in the wake of
President’s Trump’s undermining of human rights diplomacy,
Congress may be reawakening to its role.

